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Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: Lessons 





“From this day forward, I no longer shall tinker with the machinery of death.”—
Justice Harry Blackmun1 
 
“[T]he fog of confusion that is our annually improvised Eighth Amendment, 
‘death is different’ jurisprudence . . . .”—Justice Antonin Scalia2 
 
In the “evolving standards” view of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
of the Eighth Amendment,3 the limitations imposed by that provision are supposed 
to reflect a national consensus.4  When it comes to regulating the process by which 
murderers who are eligible for capital punishment are actually selected for it, the 
only consensus is that the Supreme Court has made a complete mess of it. 
Those who believe that the Court should restrict capital punishment even more 
tightly, or ban it altogether, contend that the limitations imposed to date have failed 
to correct the problems the Court set out to correct.5  Those who believe that the 
Court has gone much too far into micromanagement of procedure, under a pretense 
of enforcing the Constitution, contend that the cure is worse than any actual disease.6  
From the latter viewpoint, the fact that it is routine for unquestionably guilty 
murderers whose crimes are undeniably far worse than the median homicide to sit 
on death row decades after their sentencing7 represents a colossal failure of judicial 
activism.  Shifting majorities have imposed rules, each of which seemed to be an 
improvement in policy to a majority or plurality of justices at the time, but none of 
which had any sound basis in the “text and tradition of the Constitution.”8  The 
combined weight of these “improvements” is what makes the system dysfunctional.  
Our system would be far better at delivering justice if the Court had merely set the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
*   Legal Director, Criminal Justice Legal Foundation 
1   Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
2   Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 751 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
3   See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
4   See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005). 
5   See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
6   See id. at 2753 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
7   See, e.g., Dan Morain, Lawrence Bittaker, A Most Depraved Killer, Twists Justice System, 
SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 20, 2016, 5:31 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/opinion/opn-columns-
blogs/dan-morain/article96800957.html. 
8   Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1141 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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macro rules for a valid system of capital punishment in Gregg v. Georgia9 and then 
left implementation of the systems within those broad boundaries to state courts and 
legislatures.  It might even be better if the Court had gone ahead with a “limited coup 
d’état”10 and abolished capital punishment outright in Furman v. Georgia11 or Gregg 
and been overruled by constitutional amendment, as happened in California and 
Massachusetts.12 
 
I. DEFINING JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
First, it is necessary to define the term “judicial activism,” because that term 
has been given a number of different definitions.  I define “judicial activism” as a 
decision that declares that a provision of the Constitution requires a particular rule, 
even though it was not understood to require that rule at the time it was adopted, in 
order to achieve a policy result that the judge deems desirable.  Such a decision takes 
a policy choice that was assigned to the legislative power by the Constitution and 
reassigns it to the judicial power. 
The clearest example of judicial activism in the criminal law is the exclusionary 
rule supposedly contained in the Fourth Amendment.  The rule was unknown to the 
law at the time of the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and for a century 
thereafter.13  The rule’s most prominent defenders make their case on other grounds, 
not even attempting to defend it on the basis of original understanding.14 
An example of a constitutional line of cases that does not come within this 
definition is the Confrontation Clause line of Crawford v. Washington.15  People 
committed to upholding the Constitution as it was adopted by the democratic process 
can disagree on how to apply the Crawford rule,16 but the basis of the rule is the 
original meaning of the Sixth Amendment.17 
                                                                                                                                                                           
9   Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
10   See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 6 (1971). 
11  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
12  See People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880 (Cal. 1972); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 27; District Attorney 
v. Watson, 411 N.E.2d 1274 (Mass. 1980); MASS. CONST. art. XXVI, pt. 1; see infra text accompanying 
note 102. 
13  Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 786 (1994). 
14  See, e.g., 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1 (5th ed. 2012); Yale Kamisar, In 
Defense of the Search and Seizure Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 119 (2003).  One 
of the very few attempts to make an originalist case is Roger Roots, The Originalist Case for the Fourth 
Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 45 GONZAGA L. REV. 1 (2010).  For my refutation, see Brief Amicus 
Curiae of the Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in Support of Petitioner, Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 
2056 (2016) (No. 14-1373), http://cjlf.org/program/briefs/StrieffE.pdf. 
15  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
16  Compare Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006), with id. at 838 (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
17  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60. 
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This definition of judicial activism distinguishes legitimate from illegitimate 
judicial review based on the justification for judicial review laid out in Marbury v. 
Madison.18  Legitimate power comes from the people.  The legislature’s legitimate 
power is only that delegated to it by the people, subject to the boundaries the people 
put on it.19  An act that exceeds those limits is not law and can be disregarded by 
courts because, and only because, the superior law established by the people controls 
over the inferior law enacted by the legislature.20  “The principles [established in the 
Constitution] are deemed fundamental.  And as the authority, from which they 
proceed, is supreme, and can seldom act, they are designed to be permanent.”21  That 
is, the people have reserved the power to change the constitution to themselves 
through the amendment process.  They have not delegated it to the legislative branch 
acting through ordinary legislation,22 and just as surely they have not delegated it to 
the courts. 
A definition of judicial activism that includes legitimate as well as illegitimate 
judicial review would be simpler, but it would also be useless.  Suzanna Sherry 
defines “judicial activism” as all judicial review of legislative and executive actions 
and then defends “judicial activism” as so defined.23  Such an argument is a reverse 
straw man fallacy.24 Instead of defending the judicial activism that its critics actually 
attack, Sherry sets up a straw man that no one is attacking and defends it. 
Legitimate judicial review protects the people’s right of democratic self-
government from the legislature by enforcing constitutional limitations as they were 
understood at the time of adoption from subsequent legislation that exceeds those 
limits.  Illegitimate judicial review violates the people’s right of democratic self-
government by changing the limits on the courts’ own will to strike down legislation 
that is within the limits as they were intended.  The latter is judicial activism. 
 
II. PRELUDE TO FURMAN 
 
The 1960s were a time of rapid social change in America, especially in the area 
of civil rights.  This is the area where advocates of judicial activism cite its most 
important success.  In 1954, in Brown v. Board of Education,25 the Supreme Court 
declared “separate but equal” racially segregated schools to violate the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and in a companion case from the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
18  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
19  Id. at 176. 
20  Id. at 178. 
21  Id. at 176 (emphasis added). 
22  See id. at 177. 
23  See Suzanna Sherry, Why We Need More Judicial Activism 4 (Vand. U. L. Sch., Working 
Paper No. 13-3, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2213372. 
24  Cf. RUGGERO J. ALDISERT, LOGIC FOR LAWYERS 171 (3d ed. 1997) (straw man fallacy is 
misrepresenting the opponents’ arguments and then attacking an argument they did not make). 
25  Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
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District of Columbia they discovered an “equal protection component” in the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable against the federal 
government.26  There is no doubt that neither of these specific results were intended 
at the time of the respective amendment’s enactments.27  It took another decade for 
Congress to finally break the filibuster and pass the sweeping Civil Rights Act of 
1964.  The Court had led the way, and the country eventually came around. 
In the 1960s, opponents of the death penalty had reason to hope that the country 
would also move their way on that issue.  Since 1936, Gallup has polled on the 
question “Are you in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder?” 
That question is flawed as a measure of absolute support for capital punishment,28 
but it is useful for tracking relative changes over time simply because of its long 
history.  The poll showed substantial majorities in favor until the mid-1950s but then 
a steady decline until a plurality was briefly opposed in 1966.29 
Why did public support decline so significantly?  One likely reason is that in 
the growing consciousness of civil rights, many people were concerned about 
unequal application to black defendants.  A second reason was that America had 
seen a long stretch of exceptionally low crime, an 18-year period that Barry Latzer 
called the “golden years.”30  A graph of the spread between yes and no answers to 
Gallup’s standard death penalty question and a graph of violent crime rates are 
remarkably in sync in their ups and downs.  See Figure 1. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
26  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
27  An originalist case could be made for the result as a remedial measure because in practice 
the separate schools were not equal, and the burden of suing district by district denied equality in 
practice.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82 (1990).  But that was not the rationale 
of Brown. 
28  See Kent Scheidegger, Gallup: 2/3 Say DP Imposed About Right or Not Enough, CRIME AND 
CONSEQUENCES (Oct. 25, 2016, 1:47 PM), http://www.crimeandconsequences.com/crimblog/2016/10/
gallup-23-say-dp-imposed-about.html. 
29  Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
30  BARRY LATZER, THE RISE AND FALL OF VIOLENT CRIME IN AMERICA 43–44 (2016). 




The Supreme Court did not take up a direct challenge to the constitutionality of 
the death penalty during the 1960s.  However, it did deal the penalty a staggering 
blow in Witherspoon v. Illinois31 in 1968.  The Court declared the very widespread 
practice of removing jurors opposed to the death penalty to be unconstitutional.32  
The Court made the decision fully retroactive,33 resulting in a large number of 
reversals.  Some opponents believed that America had seen its last execution.34  
Support for the death penalty had reached a historic low, and a de facto moratorium 
was in place while states recovered from Witherspoon and waited to see what the 
Court would do next.  The political will might not have been there to restore capital 
punishment. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
31  Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
32  Id. at 522. 
33  Id. at 523 n.22. 
34  See MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL: THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT 123 (1973). 
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It was not to be.  Support grew as crime increased.  In the next two years, the 
Supreme Court ducked opportunities to address broad assaults on capital 
punishment.35  In 1971, the Court finally gave an answer, and it dealt the anti-death-
penalty movement a setback that seemed to be as large as its victory in Witherspoon 
had seemed four years earlier, though again appearances would turn out to be 
deceiving. 
In McGautha v. California,36 the Court granted certiorari limited to the question 
of whether giving juries in capital cases discretion in the penalty determination 
without standards to guide them violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  The same day, the Court granted certiorari in Crampton v. Ohio.37  On 
the standardless discretion question, Crampton asserted the Equal Protection Clause 
as well as the Due Process Clause.38  In a separate question, he challenged Ohio’s 
procedure of determining guilt and punishment in a single verdict, unlike 
California’s bifurcated procedure.39 
The Supreme Court rejected both arguments by a 6-3 vote.  The majority 
opinion and the concurrence were written by Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 
respectively, two major figures in the Court’s history with very different approaches 
and styles.  Justice Harlan’s opinion for the Court laid out the early history of capital 
punishment, where death was the mandatory sentence subject only to executive 
clemency.40  This was followed by a discussion of the evolution of unregulated 
mercy on the part of the jury,41 and a policy discussion of proposals by the American 
Law Institute and the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Law for 
guiding the jury with lists of factors for them to follow.42  In a discussion that seems 
prescient in light of later developments, Justice Harlan noted that such lists would 
be of limited value.  They could not be exclusive due to the infinite variety of 
circumstances, and if not exclusive they would be little more than suggestions.43  
The opinion was framed as a challenge under the Due Process Clause, making no 
mention of Crampton’s Equal Protection challenge.  Yet it concluded with language 
that implied a preclusion of recasting the same argument under a different provision 
of the Constitution.  “In light of history, experience, and the present limitations of 
human knowledge, we find it quite impossible to say that committing to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
35  Maxwell v. Bishop, 398 U.S. 262, 263–64 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 249 
n.3 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
36  McGautha v. California, 398 U.S. 936, 936 (1970). 
37  Crampton v. Ohio, 398 U.S. 936, 936 (1970). 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197–99 (1971). 
41  Id. at 199–202. 
42  Id. at 202–03. 
43  Id. at 207. 
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untrammeled discretion of the jury the power to pronounce life or death in capital 
cases is offensive to anything in the Constitution.”44 
If the Due Process claim was expressly rejected and if the Equal Protection 
claim was rejected sub silento, what was left?  A year earlier, former Justice 
Goldberg and his former clerk Alan Dershowitz had published a law review article 
claiming that the Eighth Amendment precluded the death penalty.45  Justice Black 
in his concurring opinion sought to shut the door to that challenge, and Justice 
Brennan in his dissent sought to keep it open. 
Justice Black’s concurrence was characteristically pithy.  He said he agreed 
with the majority’s result and most of its reasoning, but he rejected any implication 
that the Supreme Court had the authority to disapprove any procedure it thought was 
unfair without some grounding in a specific constitutional guarantee.46  He reached 
out to reject the notion that the arguments rejected that day could be brought back in 
through the Eighth Amendment.  In his view, it was enough to preclude that 
argument that the death penalty was in use at the time of ratification.47  He concluded 
with a rejection of judicial activism as clear as anyone has ever stated it.  “Although 
some people have urged that this Court should amend the Constitution by 
interpretation to keep it abreast of modern ideas, I have never believed that lifetime 
judges in our system have any such legislative power.”48  Justice Brennan noted 
twice that the Eighth Amendment challenge was not before the Court.49 
Most observers believed that any broad judicial challenge to the death penalty 
was dead for the foreseeable future.50  There was clearly not a majority on the Court 
willing to rule that capital punishment was unconstitutional per se.  The standardless 
discretion argument had been rejected under the provision where it most naturally 
fit.  The strongest argument was that this system led to racially discriminatory 
application, but that argument sounds in equal protection, which had been raised and 
rejected, even if not discussed.  Justice Black argued that the Court should take up 
the Eighth Amendment argument, feeling confident it would be rejected.  Justice 
Brennan opposed this move, with the same view of the likely outcome.51  Justice 
Black prevailed, and the Court granted certiorari in four capital cases, calling for 
briefing on the Eighth Amendment question.52 
                                                                                                                                                                           
44  Id. (emphasis added). 
45  Arthur J. Goldberg & Alan M. Dershowitz, Declaring the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 
83 HARV. L. REV. 1773 (1970). 
46  McGautha, 402 U.S. at 225 (Black, J., concurring in the judgment). 
47  Id. at 226. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. at 306, 310 n.74 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
50  EVAN MANDERY, WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICA 111–12 (2013). 
51  William J. Brennan, The 1986 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture: Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Death Penalty: A View from the Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 313, 321–22 (1986). 
52  See Furman v. Georgia, 403 U.S. 952 (1971). 
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It seems inconceivable that the cases could come out differently than 
McGautha.  Justices Black and Harlan resigned from the Court early in the following 
term, but their successors would be appointed by President Nixon,53 and they would 
surely be more conservative and less receptive to activist arguments, not more.  
Additional evidence of discriminatory application could be and would be presented, 
but it is far-fetched to imagine that such an argument could be accepted under the 
inapposite “cruel and unusual” limitation the year after it was rejected under the 
spot-on “equal protection.”  Surely the Supreme Court could not be so unprincipled 
as to pound a square peg of an argument into a round constitutional hole the year 
after knocking it out of the square hole where it actually fit, could it? 
 
III. THE REAL EIGHTH AMENDMENT 
 
The words “cruel and unusual” are not self-explanatory.  Understanding the 
original understanding requires a dive into history.  At the time of Furman, the only 
substantial exploration of the original understanding was an article by Anthony 
Granucci.54  The article was cited eight times in Furman.55  More recently, Professor 
John Stinneford has examined the original meaning more extensively in a series of 
three articles.56  This later scholarship sheds additional light on the original 
understanding, particularly the meaning of “unusual.” 
The phrase “nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted” was copied verbatim 
from the English Bill of Rights of 1689 to the Virginia Declaration of Rights in 1776 
to the Eighth Amendment in 1791.57  While the wording was unchanged, the 
understood meaning of “cruel” may have shifted between England and America.  
Granucci contends that in the English Bill of Rights, “cruel” punishments referred 
to unjustly harsh ones, but torturous punishments remained authorized for the most 
heinous crimes, particularly treason.58  In America, he argues, the Framers 
misinterpreted the English law and believed that “cruel” referred to torturous 
punishments.59  Stinneford, however, contends that “cruel” meant “unduly harsh” in 
early America as well as England.60  This dispute need not be addressed here because 
                                                                                                                                                                           
53  MANDERY, supra note 50, at 125. 
54  See Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:” The Original 
Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839, 839 (1969). 
55  See Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 n.2, 274, 275 n.17, 316 n.5, 318 n.13, 319 n.14, 376 n.2, 419 
n.3.  
56  John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar 
to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U.L. REV. 1739 (2008) [hereinafter Stinneford, Unusual]; John F. 
Stinneford, Death, Desuetude, and Original Meaning, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 531 (2014) [hereinafter 
Stinneford, Desuetude]; John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Cruel,” 105 GEO. L. J. 441 
(2017) [hereinafter Stinneford, Cruel]. 
57  Granucci, supra note 54, at 840. 
58  Id. at 855–56, 860. 
59  Id. at 860–65. 
60  Stinneford, Cruel, supra note 56, at 473. 
2019] TINKERING WITH THE MACHINERY OF DEATH 139 
 
 
the Supreme Court’s regulation of capital sentencing procedure would not be 
justified under either interpretation.  
Perhaps more significant, though less appreciated, is the meaning of “unusual.”  
Stinneford argues that “[a]t the time the Bill of Rights was adopted, the term 
‘unusual’ had at least two possible meanings: ‘out of the ordinary’ and ‘contrary to 
long usage,’” the latter being a legal term of art in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries.61  After a long review of the history, he concludes that the framers of the 
Bill of Rights used the term in the latter sense.62 
The English Bill of Rights provision was directed at the judiciary, not the 
legislature.  As an ordinary Act of Parliament and not a superior form of law, the 
protections of the English act could be diluted by later legislation.  The pertinent 
“whereas” clause of the English Bill of Rights referred to “illegal” punishments, 
while the operative section referred to “unusual” punishments.63  No one at the time 
seems to have thought there was any significant difference.  The problem was judges 
imposing punishments “utterly and directly contrary to the known laws and statutes 
and freedoms of this realm.”64  
American bills of rights, state and federal, were intentionally different from the 
English model in one important respect.  Restraining the legislative branch was a 
principal purpose.  The grievances in the Declaration of Independence were not 
aimed solely at King George but also included protests against Acts of Parliament 
for, among other things, violating the traditional rights to trial by jury and trial in the 
locality of the crime.65  While the Federal Convention was sitting, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court declared an act of the Legislature unconstitutional for violating the 
right to jury trial in that state’s constitutional bill of rights.66  In the Federalist, 
Madison described how experience in the states in the years since the Revolution 
demonstrated that the legislature was the most dangerous branch.67  Jefferson 
endorsed the idea of amending the new Constitution to add a bill of rights, in part 
because it would empower the judiciary to protect rights against legislative 
encroachment.68 
The Anti-Federalist attacks on the proposed Constitution for lacking a bill of 
rights noted the absence of a “cruel and unusual punishments” provision, and these 
attacks are revealing glimpses at the original understanding.  Granucci considers the 
ratification debates “sufficient contemporary comment to establish the interpretation 
                                                                                                                                                                           
61  Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 56, at 1767. 
62  Id. at 1825. 
63  Id. at 1760; Granucci, supra note 54, at 855. 
64  Granucci, supra note 54, at 855. 
65  See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15–24 (U.S. 1776). 
66  Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. 5, 5 (1787). 
67  THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
68  Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in NATIONAL ARCHIVES, 
FOUNDERS ONLINE, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-12-02-0015.  
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which the framers placed on the words ‘cruel and unusual.’”69  In Massachusetts, 
Abraham Holmes recited a long list of traditional freedoms that Congress was not 
restrained from abridging.  Among these is that Congress was “nowhere restrained 
from inventing the most cruel and unheard-of punishments.”70  Holmes’s use of 
“unheard-of” is revealing.  He was not concerned with Congress prescribing 
punishments that were traditionally used or commonly used at the time, even though 
they might be considered cruel.  He was concerned with new inventions in 
punishment or adoption of punishments used in other countries but not in England 
or America.  He raised the specter of the Spanish Inquisition.71 
 
In Virginia, the fiery orator Patrick Henry made a similar argument. 
 
In this business of legislation, your members of Congress will loose the 
restriction of not imposing excessive fines, demanding excessive bail, and 
inflicting cruel and unusual punishments.  These are prohibited by your 
declaration of rights.  What has distinguished our ancestors?—That they 
would not admit of tortures, or cruel and barbarous punishment.  But 
Congress may introduce the practice of the civil law, in preference to that 
of the common law.  They may introduce the practice of France, Spain, 
and Germany—of torturing, to extort a confession of the crime.  They will 
say that they might as well draw examples from those countries as from 
Great Britain, and they will tell you that there is such a necessity of 
strengthening the arm of government, that they must have a criminal 
equity, and extort confession by torture, in order to punish with still more 
relentless severity.  We are then lost and undone.72 
 
The English Bill of Rights had been directed at innovation by judges.  The Anti-
Federalists were more concerned about innovation by Congress.  Prohibiting 
traditional punishments did not appear on anyone’s agenda.73 
Only one snippet of legislative history shows any concern regarding prohibition 
of traditional punishments, and that was to warn against it.  The debate on the Bill 
of Rights in the House of Representatives was surprisingly brief.  Only two members 
spoke on what became the Eighth Amendment.  Congressman Smith of South 
                                                                                                                                                                           
69  Granucci, supra note 54, at 841; see also Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 56, at 1800–08 
(discussing ratification debates with particular emphasis on Virginia). 
70  Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Jan. 9, 1788) in 2 
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 
111 (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. Philadelphia, 1891). 
71  Id. 
72  Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia (June 2, 1788) in 3 DEBATES IN 
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 1, 447–48 
(Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. Philadelphia, 1891). 
73  See Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 56, at 1807 (argument was for adherence to “long usage” 
and against innovation). 
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Carolina objected that the wording was “too indefinite,”74 a very valid concern if the 
words are only considered on their face without being limited by their original 
understanding.  Congressman Livermore was somewhat more expansive. 
 
No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is sometimes 
necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping and perhaps 
having their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from 
inflicting these punishments because they are cruel?  If a more lenient 
mode of correcting vice and deterring others from the commission of it 
could be invented, it would be very prudent in the Legislature to adopt it; 
but until we have some security that this will be done, we ought not be 
restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of that kind.75 
 
Most of the members evidently did not think much of this argument.  No one 
bothered to respond.  “The question was put on the clause, and it was agreed to by a 
considerable majority.”76  It is not likely that the House agreed to let itself be 
restrained by judges from imposing traditional punishments.  The obvious answer to 
Livingston’s argument is that the conjunctive “and unusual” requirement precludes 
judicial abolition of a traditional punishment which is still in common use. 
The same Congress that proposed the Bill of Rights enacted a general criminal 
law for federal offenses and ordinary crimes in areas of exclusive federal 
jurisdiction.  That law provided for whipping.77  There does not appear to be any 
indication that anyone thought it would violate the Eighth Amendment upon 
ratification. 
Justice Black believed that the fact that capital punishment was widely 
practiced at the time the Eighth Amendment was ratified was sufficient by itself to 
preclude a challenge to it under that provision.78  If it were that simple, then 
whipping and perhaps even cutting off ears would be constitutional, and that is an 
argument against such simplistic reasoning.  Originalism need not be that rigid or 
simplistic, however.   
The Constitution gives Congress the power to create and support armies and 
navies,79 but it says nothing about air forces.  Armies and navies were the kinds of 
military forces known at the time, and interpreting those words to encompass the 
kinds of military forces known at this time is consistent with the people’s will in 
adopting the Constitution.  We must always keep in mind that the purpose of fidelity 
to the original understanding is to preserve the people’s right of self-government by 
                                                                                                                                                                           
74  1 ANNALS OF CONG. 782 (1789). 
75  Id. at 782–83. 
76  Id. at 783.  Stinneford states that Livermore was out of the mainstream of thought of the 
founding era; See Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 56, at 1809. 
77  Crimes Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 16, 1 Stat. 112, 116. 
78  McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring). 
79  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–12. 
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maintaining the limits on legislative authority that the people put there and not 
inventing limits that the people never intended.  As the world changes, the limits can 
be applied in a way that most closely fits the original understanding to the world as 
it presently exists. 
Delegate Holmes captured the essence of what became the Eighth Amendment 
by referring to “cruel and unheard-of punishments.”  Whipping was a common 
punishment in 1791, but it is “unheard-of” today.  It is constitutionally “unusual” 
within the original understanding of the Eighth Amendment not because ivory-tower 
opinion deplores it, not because half the states have abolished it,80 not because the 
Supreme Court in its independent judgment finds it has no legitimate penological 
purpose,81 but because it long ago vanished from our law and practice.82 
Chief Justice Earl Warren’s plurality opinion in Trop v. Dulles83 is a favorite 
of opponents of the death penalty for its high-sounding but vacuous statement that 
the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”84  More pertinent but less 
often cited is Warren’s express rejection of the use of the Eighth Amendment for 
exactly the purpose that those who quote those words usually seek to support.  “[T]he 
death penalty has been employed throughout our history, and, in a day when it is 
still widely accepted, it cannot be said to violate the constitutional concept of 
cruelty.”85  The judiciary cannot legitimately deploy the Eighth Amendment to 
forbid a punishment that is supported by both history and current acceptance. 
 
IV. FURMAN AND THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
 
It would seem impossible that two members of the McGautha majority would 
turn 180 degrees just a year later on the pretense of construing a different provision 
of the Constitution, one much less suited to the discrimination problem than the 
Equal Protection Clause raised but ignored in McGautha.  Yet that is exactly what 
happened. 
In 1972, the Supreme Court had four Justices appointed by President Nixon and 
five who had been members of the Warren Court.  That division proved to be more 
important than the political party of the appointing President that gets so much 
attention today.  Of the five, Justice White tended to be the most favorable to the 
                                                                                                                                                                           
80  But cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 343 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (majority finding 
“consensus” from less than half of the states). 
81  But cf. id. at 348–49 (Supreme Court declaring a punishment unconstitutional based on its 
independent judgment is an unconstitutional usurpation of power). 
82  See Stinneford, Desuetude, supra note 56, at 589. 
83  Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1957). 
84  Id. at 101. 
85  Id. at 99.  Stinneford justifiably criticizes Trop and its “evolving standards” statement, among 
others, for erasing the word “unusual” out of the Eighth Amendment and setting the stage for much 
mischief to follow.  Stinneford, Unusual, supra note 56, at 1749–51.  It is curious that he does not 
mention the one passage in Trop that is fully consistent with his thesis. 
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prosecution generally, and, as his opinions would show in Furman and later cases, 
he was the most comfortable with capital punishment.  
Justice White was the key, and given his commitment to civil rights,86 the 
discrimination argument was the one most likely to win him over.  Evan Mandery 
cites an unnamed source saying that Justice White turned ashen upon hearing the 
evidence of discrimination during oral argument.87  He further claims that there was 
a secret agreement between Justice Stewart and Justice White.  They would both 
write opinions that the present death penalty was unconstitutional but only because 
of infrequent use, not unconstitutional altogether.88  Whether Mandery has a 
sufficient source for this claim is disputed,89 but it is consistent with their opinions 
in Furman and Gregg. 
The Stewart and White opinions deserve the closest attention because they are 
on the “narrowest grounds,” a method of analyzing Supreme Court cases with no 
majority that was announced by the lead opinion in Gregg90 and shortly afterward 
endorsed in an opinion of the Court in Marks v. United States.91  They are a 
remarkable pair of opinions. 
Justice Stewart began by denouncing the death penalty as “absolute 
renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.”92  That is simply a 
personal opinion which can neither be supported nor refuted and with which a great 
many people disagree.  He noted that mandatory death sentences were not before the 
Court,93 probably expecting that no contemporary legislature would enact a 
mandatory death penalty except for very narrowly defined and rarely committed 
offenses. 
Moving to the laws before the Court, his reasons are unrelated to anything that 
the Eighth Amendment was understood to prohibit at the time of its adoption.  On 
the “unusual” prong, particularly, he notes that the punishment is infrequently 
imposed for murder.94  But frequent mercy and infrequent application does not place 
a punishment outside the traditions and law of the country, which is what “unusual” 
means in the Eighth Amendment.  The death penalty was still “widely applied” in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
86  See Frank Scaturro, The Unjustly Forgotten Legacy of Byron White, NATIONAL REVIEW (Mar. 
30, 2017, 5:00 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2017/03/byron-white-supreme-court-legacy-
judicial-restraint-unjustly-forgotten/ (last visited Aug. 25, 2019). 
87   MANDERY, supra note 50, at 166. 
88   Id. 
89  David Oshinsky, Stay of Execution, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY (Aug. 30, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/books/review/a-wild-justice-by-evan-j-mandery.html  (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2019); Michael Meltsner, Death Penalty and the Law, N.Y. TIMES OPINION LETTER, 
(Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/opinion/death-penalty-and-the-law.html (last 
visited Aug. 25, 2019). 
90  Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976). 
91  Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192–93 (1977). 
92  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (1972). 
93  Id. at 307. 
94  Id. at 309. 
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the sense that the Trop plurality used that term when there were hundreds of people 
on death row.  It had not vanished like the pillory. 
This is followed by a very revealing statement.  “These death sentences are 
cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and 
unusual.”95  An inanimate force of nature cannot be “cruel and unusual” in any way 
relevant to the meaning of that phrase in the Eighth Amendment.  The imposition of 
punishments that are either within or outside the law and customs of a country is 
necessarily a human activity.  Justice Stewart’s complaint of application that is either 
random or racially biased96 resonates in equal protection. 
Justice White cast the monumental deciding vote that temporarily abolished the 
death penalty in the United States.  His opinion explaining his vote does not contain 
a single citation.  He made a policy argument that the death penalty as it then existed, 
so rarely applied to the crimes for which it was authorized, did not serve a function 
in the criminal justice system.  Why is it the Supreme Court and not the state 
legislatures that decides whether it serves a function?  Why is the Court’s own 
evaluation of purpose the deciding factor rather than the history and current 
acceptance noted in Trop?  “Judicial review, by definition, often involves a conflict 
between judicial and legislative judgment as to what the Constitution means or 
requires.”97  Indeed, but when the judiciary disagrees, it normally backs up its 
opinion with a discussion of the meaning of the constitutional provision.  Such an 
explanation is all the more essential when the meaning is radically different from 
the historical understanding.  This opinion is a good policy argument; it is devoid of 
proper constitutional law. 
If racial discrimination was really behind the decision to throw out the 
unguided-discretion capital sentencing statutes, as it likely was,98 the principled way 
to attack that problem would have been to say that the equal protection claim, 
although stated in Crampton’s question presented, was not really addressed in 
McGautha, and given new evidence the Court would need to reconsider it.  If that 
course had been taken, the focus in subsequent cases might have stayed on whether 
state procedures were conducive to evenhandedness in application.  Because 
Furman was allegedly based on a different provision of the Constitution, divorced 
from its original meaning, it was little but an empty jug for a succession of Justices 
to pour their policy preferences into. 
The notion that Furman spelled the end for the death penalty in America99 did 
not last long.  To say that there was a wave of popular support would be an 
understatement.  It was more like a tsunami. 
The Gallup Poll’s standard question had only a 9-point margin for “favor” over 
“oppose” in March before the decision, but it jumped to a 25-point margin in 
                                                                                                                                                                           
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 309–10. 
97  Id. at 313. 
98  See Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 479–84 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
99  See MANDERY, supra note 50, at 241–43. 
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November.100  The California Supreme Court had struck down that state’s death 
penalty under the state constitution four months before Furman,101 but the people of 
the state swiftly signed a petition to amend the state constitution and rebuke the state 
court, and the proposition won by a landslide.102 
By the time the issue returned to the Supreme Court, the legislatures of thirty-
five states had enacted post-Furman death penalty statutes.103  Congress enacted a 
post-Furman death penalty law for airplane hijacking,104 which passed the Senate 
unanimously.105  Any claim that capital punishment was inconsistent with the values 
of the American people had been refuted beyond question. 
There was, however, one major problem.  Furman had left legislatures with no 
clear roadmap on what kind of death penalty statute the Supreme Court would 
approve.  There were five separate opinions, with individual rationales and no 
Justice expressly joining any others.  Possibly, at least some of the Justices were so 
far out of touch with the sense of the nation that they genuinely believed that no 
major effort toward restoration would be forthcoming, so no roadmap would be 
needed.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, because Furman attached a new 
meaning to a constitutional provision with no historical basis for it, there was no 
history of earlier cases to fall back on. 
The Framers believed that a supreme court was necessary to settle questions of 
federal law conclusively.106  In terms of its institutional raison d’etre, Furman was 
the single worst failure in the history of the Court.107  The Court told the legislatures 
of the nation that their laws for punishing the worst crimes that state governments 
generally punish were unconstitutional, but it provided no clear answers on why they 
were or how to fix them. 
The legislatures with the largest jurisdictions, the most resources, and 
presumably the highest degree of sophistication—Congress, California, and New 
York—all concluded that only mandatory sentencing would pass muster.108  A 
                                                                                                                                                                           
100 Death Penalty, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1606/Death-Penalty.aspx (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2019). 
101 People v. Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 899 (Cal. 1972). 
102 See People v. Frierson, 599 P.2d 587, 612–13 (Cal. 1979); Statewide Ballot Measure 
Database, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, www.ncsl.org/research/elections-and-
campaigns/ballot-measures-database.aspx (Nov. 17, 2018) (Prop. 17 approved by 67.5%). 
103 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179–80 n.23 (1976). 
104 See id. at 180 n.24. 
105 An Act to amend the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 to implement the Convention for the 
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft; to provide a more effective program to prevent aircraft 
piracy; and for other purposes, S. 39, 93rd Congress (1973–1974), https://www.congress.gov/bill/93rd-
congress/senate-bill/39/actions.  
106 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 22 (Alexander Hamilton). 
107 That is not to say it was the worst decision overall.  Others are worse for the damage they 
caused. 
108 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. IV 1970); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (Supp. 1976); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW § 60.06 (1975). 
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committee created by the National Association of Attorneys General reached the 
same conclusion, and about half the states passing reinstatement laws followed 
suit.109  Texas enacted a unique statute that created a new degree of capital murder 
and then had the jury determine the sentence by its answers to “special issues.”110  
Florida followed the Model Penal Code most closely, with a list of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances.111 
Georgia made the smallest change from its pre-Furman statutes.  The death-
eligible class is narrowed by the finding of an aggravating circumstance, but once 
that is found the jury has nearly as much discretion as before.112  Reading the 
opinions in Furman, one would think that this was a foolish choice and that 
Georgia’s was the statute most likely to be struck down.  In fact, it would be one of 
the very few statutes from the interim period that survived the Supreme Court’s flip-
flops largely intact, at least as applied to murder. 
 
V. GUIDED DISCRETION  
 
Five capital murder cases were heard together in the Supreme Court in its 
October 1975 Term.  The statutes reviewed included two mandatory ones from 
North Carolina113 and Louisiana114 and the Texas, Florida, and Georgia statutes 
noted above.  The Court consisted of eight of the nine Justices who had heard 
Furman plus Justice Stevens, who had succeeded Justice Douglas. 
Justice Powell’s notes of the post-argument conference are now available.  
Justice Stewart had been turned around since Furman by the massive legislative 
response.115  “In light of what 35 states have done since 1972, [I] can no longer argue 
that [capital punishment] is incompatible with ‘evolving standards of decency.’”116  
Justice Marshall’s astonishing response, in essence, is that it is not what the 
American people think about the death penalty that matters, but what they would 
think if they were not a bunch of ignoramuses.117  Absent from this assessment is 
any acknowledgment that people as well informed as Justice Marshall can have 
different views as to the facts and their interpretation. 
                                                                                                                                                                           
109 See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 556 P.2d 1101, 1117 (Cal. 1976) (Clark, J., concurring). 
110 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 268–69 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, & Stevens, 
JJ.).  Citations to the five 1976 death penalty cases are to the joint opinions of these three Justices unless 
otherwise indicated.  When necessary to refer to a specific opinion for clarity, they are cited below as 
simply “lead opinion.” 
111 See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1976). 
112 See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 872 (1983). 
113 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285–86 (1976). 
114 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 328–29 (1976). 
115 Gregg v. Georgia, Box 33, Supreme Court Case Files, Lewis F. Powell Jr. Papers, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, at 144 [hereinafter Powell Papers]. 
116 Id.; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 180–81 (lead opinion). 
117 Id. at 232 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Powell was initially on the fence about the mandatory Louisiana and 
North Carolina statutes, but he ultimately cast the deciding vote to strike them down.  
So, ironically, the laws that conformed to what Furman seemed to require were 
invalidated, and the one that seemed most vulnerable was upheld.  This flip-flop was 
further confirmation that the Supreme Court was not engaged in the Marbury 
process of upholding the people’s constitution against legislatures exceeding their 
delegated authority, but rather making it up as they went along. 
In Woodson v. North Carolina, the lead opinion reviewed the long history 
leading to the universal rejection of mandatory capital sentencing for broadly 
defined crimes before Furman.118  But what about Furman itself, deemed by most 
observers to require mandatory sentencing?  That understanding was used by the 
challengers in these five cases to attack the statutes as unconstitutional because they 
were not mandatory or not really mandatory.  The lead opinion gives us one of the 
most shockingly disingenuous statements in any Supreme Court opinion in history: 
 
Perhaps the one important factor about evolving social values regarding 
capital punishment upon which the Members of the Furman Court agreed 
was the accuracy of McGautha’s assessment of our Nation’s rejection of 
mandatory death sentences.  See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S., at 245-
246 (Douglas, J., concurring); id., at 297-298 (Brennan, J., concurring); 
id., at 339 (Marshall, J., concurring); id., at 402-403 (Burger, C. J., with 
whom Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ., joined, dissenting); id., at 
413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).119 
 
Conspicuously absent from this alleged agreement are the opinions of Justices 
Stewart and White, which the same three Justices claimed the same day were the 
controlling opinions in Furman because they were based on the narrowest 
grounds.120  The Supreme Court as an institution and Justice Stewart in particular 
owed the Nation a profuse apology for misleading it into believing mandatory 
sentencing was required and then, four years later, flipping and declaring it 
forbidden.  Instead, we got a shameless ducking of responsibility. 
The Woodson lead opinion was quite correct on one undesirable result of 
mandatory sentencing.  If imposed for a category of crimes which includes many 
offenses that do not warrant the sentence in the eyes of most people, it will lead to 
arbitrary results through jury nullification.121  Whether a person gets the mandatory 
sentence or not may depend on the extent to which the jurors are willing to disobey 
                                                                                                                                                                           
118 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 289–94 (1976). 
119 Id. at 297. 
120 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 169 n.15. 
121 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302–03.  The lead opinion was also correct in reserving judgment on 
mandatory penalties for much narrower categories, such as murder by a prisoner serving a life sentence.  
Id. at 287 n.7.  Unfortunately, the Court would get that wrong later, after its focus had drifted away 
from equal treatment.  See Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 78–79 (1987). 
148 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 17:131 
their instructions, a result depending more on the choice of jurors than the justice of 
the case.  That is arguably a constitutional defect, though again it should come under 
equal protection, not cruel and unusual punishment.  
Not content with a rationale that made common sense, if not constitutional 
sense, the lead opinion added a section with the kind of high-sounding but 
ungrounded rhetoric that has been the plague of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence 
from Furman to the present.  The lead opinion traced the development of 
individualized sentencing, considering both details of the offense and the 
background of the offender, singing its praises.122  The opinion acknowledged that 
in noncapital cases such sentencing “reflects simply enlightened policy rather than 
a constitutional mandate” yet for capital cases made it a constitutional mandate 
anyway. 
How “enlightened” individualized sentencing is and how far the 
individualization process should be carried is very much a matter of opinion, and the 
prevailing opinion has gone back and forth throughout history.  The primary problem 
with individualized sentencing is that the sentence a defendant receives may depend 
as much on which judge he draws as on his individual blameworthiness.  The 
passage of Blackstone that is believed to have been so influential in the Founders’ 
view of the phrase “cruel and unusual punishment”123 took the view that strict 
correspondence of punishment and crime for major offenses was “one of the glories 
of our English law,” protecting people against arbitrary judges.124  In noncapital 
sentencing, boundless discretion had lost its allure by 1984, and Congress sought to 
create a middle ground with a detailed system of binding sentencing guidelines that 
took various factors into account and limited the judge to a range determined by 
those factors.125  As with Furman’s rejection of boundless discretion in the capital 
context, the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 was based in part on concerns that too 
much discretion resulted in discriminatory application.126  Today, the philosophical 
pendulum has swung back in the other direction,127 but no one can say for sure that 
its swinging has stopped.  Declaring that the Constitution mandates a particular point 
on this very debatable spectrum, thereby freezing the law and precluding adjustment 
in the light of future experience, should require compelling evidence in the text, 
history, or both of the Constitution.  Yet, there is none. 
So the North Carolina law making death the mandatory punishment for all first-
degree murders was struck down.  A companion case examined a Louisiana law that 
required death for a narrower category and effectively invited nullification through 
                                                                                                                                                                           
122 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303–04. 
123 See Granucci, supra note 54, at 862–65. 
124 Id. at 863. 
125 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005). 
126 See id. at 329 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
127 See, e.g., First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115–391. 
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lesser-included offense instructions whether justified by the evidence or not; it was 
also struck down.128 
The lead opinion’s approval of the Florida system in Proffitt v. Florida makes 
fascinating reading in light of later developments.  On the advice of the state attorney 
general and contrary to the expert consensus as to what Furman required,129 the 
legislature adopted the “guided discretion” approach.  “Evidence may be presented 
on any matter the judge deems relevant to sentencing and must include matters 
relating to certain legislatively specified aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances.”130  The statute clearly did not require that the defendants be allowed 
to introduce anything they want.  The statute was ambiguous as to whether the judge 
or jury was allowed to consider mitigating circumstances outside the statutory list.  
The lead opinion added the bracketed word “[statutory]” to its quote of the statute 
on the factors to be weighed,131 but it noted that the statute expressly limited 
aggravating factors to the statutory list and contained no similar express limit on the 
mitigating factors.132  Yet, the lead opinion did not find it necessary to resolve the 
ambiguity.  
The clear implication is that a specified list of mitigating circumstances is not 
a constitutional issue.  Rejecting a claim that the mitigation circumstances were not 
precise enough, the lead opinion held, “[t]he requirements of Furman are satisfied 
when the sentencing authority’s discretion is guided and channeled by requiring 
examination of specific factors that argue in favor of or against imposition of the 
death penalty, thus eliminating total arbitrariness and capriciousness in its 
imposition.”133  In the Texas case, the three Justices summarized their own holdings 
on the Georgia and Florida laws: 
 
In Gregg v. Georgia, we today hold constitutionally valid a capital-
sentencing system that directs the jury to consider any mitigating factors, 
and in Proffitt v. Florida we likewise hold constitutional a system that 
directs the judge and advisory jury to consider certain enumerated 
mitigating circumstances.134 
 
The important difference that the lead opinion saw between the Florida and Georgia 
statutes was not the lack of wide-open mitigation, but the fact that the judge and not 
the jury was the actual sentencer, both finding the requisite aggravating factors and 
determining the actual sentence.135  The lead opinion saw this as “a feature, not a 
                                                                                                                                                                           
128 Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 326 (1976). 
129 See Rockwell v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 420, 447–48 (1976) (Clark, J., concurring). 
130 Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 248 (emphasis added). 
131 Id. at 250. 
132 Id. at 250 n.8. 
133 Id. at 258 (emphasis added). 
134 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271–72 (1976). 
135 Id. at 251–52. 
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bug,” to use later computer terminology.  Because consistency was the key, the 
judge’s greater experience was an improvement over jury sentencing.136 
The Texas statute was a closer call.  Justice Stewart was initially uncertain 
about it,137 but eventually he went along with Justices Powell and Stevens, who had 
voted to affirm from the start.138  The Texas law was not designed as a guided 
discretion statute.  It was not a law that any legislature would be likely to enact if 
left to its own devices.  Like the other states, Texas had to guess what the Supreme 
Court would approve after Furman and was most concerned that too much 
discretion, rather than too little, was the danger.  From Furman onward, the question 
“What will the Supreme Court approve?” has distorted legislative decision-making 
in capital sentencing, like a drug that produces birth defects. 
After narrowing the eligible class to five situations in the guilt phase of the trial, 
the Texas law presented the jury with three questions.  The first required a deliberate 
homicide, the second asked about the probability of future violence, and the third 
asked about provocation by the deceased.139  The first does not involve mitigating 
circumstances, and the third rarely arises, so in most cases mitigation could only 
come in through the second.  Based on Woodson and Roberts, the Jurek lead opinion 
said, “in order to meet the requirement of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
a capital-sentencing system must allow the sentencing authority to consider 
mitigating circumstances.”140  
The lead opinion held that the Texas system met this requirement based on 
statements of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals that the jury could consider a 
number of mitigating factors in answering the dangerousness question, and that the 
court itself would consider a variety of factors in judging the sufficiency of the 
evidence.141  These state court opinions did not say or imply that the jury need be 
instructed on anything other than the statutory questions.  While a considerable 
amount of mitigating evidence could be shoehorned into the future dangerousness 
inquiry, it is obvious that not everything that might be considered mitigating could 
be made to fit.  Yet the Texas law was upheld as complying with Furman.142 
Although the language in the last part of Woodson, standing alone, might be 
stretched to say that a catch-all mitigating factor was constitutionally required, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
136 Id. at 252.  As to the finding of an aggravating circumstance making the case eligible for the 
death penalty, this holding was overruled in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016).  On the question 
of whether Hurst applies to the discretionary weighing as well, there is a split of authority which the 
U.S. Supreme Court has not yet resolved.  Compare Ex parte Bohannon, 222 So. 3d 525, 532–33 (Ala. 
2016) with Hurst v. State, 202 So. 3d 40, 44 (Fla. 2016) (on remand). 
137 Powell Papers, supra note 115, at 145. 
138 Id. at 147, 150. 
139 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 268–69. 
140 Id. at 271.  But the legislature could specify the circumstances.  See id. at 271–72; see supra 
note 134 and accompanying text. 
141 Id. at 262. 
142 Id. at 276. 
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Proffitt and Jurek preclude such an interpretation.  As of 1976, the Constitution 
included no such requirement. 
These five cases established a broad range within which states retained 
considerable freedom to shape their capital sentencing systems.  Guided discretion 
was required, including a narrowing of the class of murderers that may be considered 
for capital punishment and a consideration of mitigating circumstances which might 
or might not be limited to a specified list.  As a matter of sentencing policy, this is 
not bad.  The Supreme Court might have stopped there.  Having required the states 
to rewrite their statutes within this broad framework, the Court could have left 
further details and the application of those systems to particular cases to the state 
courts. 
Gregg and its companion cases might have been a “successful” exercise in 
judicial activism if one defines success in practical results rather than constitutional 
legitimacy.  Wrapping it up there would have left capital punishment in America 
post-1976 far better than it had been pre-1972.  Discrimination on the basis of race 
of the defendant, the greatest concern underlying Furman, was in fact reduced to a 
low enough level that numerous post-Gregg studies could not detect any race-of-
defendant bias.143  But it was not to be.  Shifting majorities of the Court could not 
resist tinkering with the machine. 
 
VI. EVERYTHING INCLUDING THE KITCHEN SINK 
 
The Supreme Court’s post-Gregg innovations in capital sentencing have fallen 
primarily into two categories: expansion of the requirement for considering 
mitigation and categorical exclusions from capital punishment.  The categorical 
exclusions have caused less damage, by far, and some might even be plausibly 
constitutional on an equal protection theory.  The first significant post-Gregg case 
was a categorical exclusion from capital punishment of crimes of rape but not 
murder of an adult victim,144 which was the kind of case that had raised the greatest 
equal protection concerns in Furman.145  The mitigation hyperinflation, on the other 
hand, was a disaster. 
Two terms after Gregg, the Supreme Court considered its first post-Furman 
Ohio capital case, Lockett v. Ohio.146 Lockett was a “Furman-hangover” case.  The 
statute involved was enacted in the interim between Furman and Gregg.  It was not 
drafted as a guided discretion statute because the consensus at the time was that the 
Supreme Court had forbidden discretion rather than required it.  Before Furman, the 
Ohio House of Representatives had passed a criminal code revision including a death 
                                                                                                                                                                           
143 The studies are discussed in my previous article.  See Kent Scheidegger, Rebutting the Myths 
About Race and the Death Penalty, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 147 (2012). 
144 Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).  The question of capital punishment for rape of 
a child was not resolved for another 31 years.  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 421 (2008). 
145 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 251 (opinion of Douglas, J.). 
146 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). 
152 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 17:131 
penalty provision along the lines of the Model Penal Code.  It would have required 
consideration of a list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, with a catch-
all.147  Furman came down while the Senate Judiciary Committee was considering 
the bill.  Misled by that decision, “the Ohio Senate developed the current sentencing 
procedure which requires the imposition of the death penalty if one of seven specific 
aggravating circumstances and none of three specific mitigating circumstances is 
found to exist.”148  The Court’s own irresponsible and extraconstitutional decision 
in Furman, not any deficiency in Ohio’s lawmaking process, was responsible for the 
discretionless statute that emerged. 
As written, mitigating circumstances in Ohio’s law were not a mechanism for 
exercising discretion, but rather a second stage of narrowing of the eligible class.  If 
one of the three mitigating factors was found, the defendant was excluded from the 
death penalty.  If none of the three was found, the sentence was death, and the 
sentencer had no discretion to impose a lesser penalty.  The three mitigating 
circumstances were narrow and relatively objective: (1) inducement by the victim; 
(2) duress, coercion, or strong provocation; or (3) mental deficiency or psychosis 
short of insanity.149 
After Gregg, the Ohio Supreme Court attempted to salvage the statute in State 
v. Bayless.150  The state court compared the statute to the one upheld in Proffitt and 
noted that both provided for the consideration of mitigating circumstances, while 
acknowledging that the Florida list was considerably broader.151  Sensing that the 
narrowness of the list might be a problem, the state court promised “to allow the 
broadest consideration of mitigating circumstances consistent with their 
language.”152  That would prove to not be broad enough. 
The Ohio statute was really more like the Texas statute in Jurek than the Florida 
statute in Proffitt.  The Texas legislature allowed a jury to spare the defendant from 
the death penalty if the crime was not deliberate, the defendant would not be 
dangerous in the future, or the crime was provoked by the deceased.  The Texas 
statute passed muster in Jurek, for the time being, because the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals decided to let a very broad array of mitigation to be considered 
under dangerousness.  But Ohio’s more specific and objective mitigating 
circumstances were not subject to as broad an array of mitigation.  The Ohio 
Legislature had done a better job of responding to what Furman required.  For that 
reason, it was in trouble post-Gregg.  In the Supreme Court’s death penalty 
jurisprudence of the 1970s and 1980s, no good deed went unpunished. 
Under Ohio’s Furman-deformed statute, Sandra Lockett was sentenced to 
death for a crime and a role in it that very few people would have thought warranted 
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a death sentence.  She had participated in planning a robbery of a pawnshop and 
waited in the car while it was being committed.  The pawnbroker tried to grab the 
gun and was killed.153  The accomplice liability and felony murder rules produced a 
murder conviction and, with no mitigating circumstance applicable, the judge had 
“‘no alternative, whether [he] like[d] the law or not’ but to impose the death 
penalty.’”154 
This statute suffered from some of the same deficiencies as the mandatory 
statutes struck down in Woodson and Roberts.  It was not a product of a legislature 
deciding on its own what circumstances should be considered mitigating but rather 
one misled by Furman to believe it had to remove discretionary weighing factors 
from the statute155 and include only categorical exclusions.  By preventing all 
consideration of factors that are almost universally considered strongly mitigating, 
minor accomplice status and lack of an intent to kill, the statute invited jury 
nullification and the consequent arbitrary application.156  This would have been 
sufficient reason to require the Ohio legislature to do it over, with an apology for 
misleading it. 
Instead, Chief Justice Warren Burger, of all people, created a new constitutional 
mandate, extended a decision he had dissented from, sowed confusion through 
contradiction of two other opinions only two years old without expressly overruling 
them, enabled a decades-long war of attrition against the death penalty, and did all 
this without a shred of justification in the real Eighth Amendment.  His plurality 
opinion in Lockett was as astonishing as it was disastrous. 
Joined by the Gregg troika, Chief Justice Burger announced “that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of 
capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect 
of a defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that 
the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.”157  To justify this 
mandate, the plurality misrepresented what had been decided only two years earlier. 
There was, indeed, language in Woodson saying that the “‘character and record 
of the individual offender’” must be considered,158 but that is a far cry from saying 
everything about his character and record must be considered.  As for Proffitt, the 
plurality claimed, “[a]lthough the Florida statute approved in Proffitt contained a list 
of mitigating factors, six Members of this Court assumed, in approving the statute, 
that the range of mitigating factors listed in the statute was not exclusive.”159  The 
six members referred to are in the lead opinion and Justice White’s concurrence.160  
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157 Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted). 
158 See id. at 601 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)). 
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As detailed above,161 the troika never resolved definitively whether the Florida 
statute permitted consideration of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances or not.  
They noted the lack of an express exclusion at one point in Proffitt and referred to 
the statute as limited to statutory mitigators at another point.  They described the 
Florida statute as limited to statutory mitigators in Jurek.  Yet Proffitt proceeded to 
a decision without answering that question.  The Lockett plurality, in essence, says 
that the Gregg cases collectively established a constitutional requirement of 
unlimited mitigation, and the Court signed off on Charles Proffitt’s execution on the 
mere assumption that Florida’s statute met that requirement.  That is not plausible, 
and Justices White and Rehnquist challenged that misrepresentation.162 
Justice Blackmun favored a more limited rule.  He did not agree with a 
sweeping requirement for all mitigating evidence, but he did agree that “a 
nontriggerman” must be allowed to introduce mitigating evidence of their role in the 
crime and mens rea.163  Why did Chief Justice Burger not go along with this more 
measured approach?  Most likely, he wished to avoid a long series of cases deciding 
which categories of mitigating evidence were or were not so essential as to make 
them constitutionally required.  
After several pages of discussion that comes as close as the Court has ever 
gotten to an apology for its flip-flopping and inscrutability,164 the plurality opinion 
says, “[t]he States now deserve the clearest guidance that the Court can provide; we 
have an obligation to reconcile previously differing views in order to provide that 
guidance.”165  This is said in an opinion that failed to command a majority and failed 
to reconcile the rule it announced with the inconsistent approval of the Florida and 
Texas system two years earlier.  Few decisions in the history of the Supreme Court 
have failed in their intended purpose so completely. 
The conflict between Lockett on one hand and Proffitt and Jurek on the other 
would cause confusion and reversals of judgments for many years afterward.  Even 
worse, though, the “everything including the kitchen sink” constitutional rule for 
mitigation combined with the rules for litigating effective assistance of counsel 
would create an unlimited source of issues for creative lawyers to tie up individual 
capital cases in repetitive, expensive proceedings that could be dragged out for 
decades.  No single decision of the Supreme Court has contributed as much to the 
dysfunction of the American system of capital punishment as Lockett.  Ironically, if 
capital punishment is killed any time in the near future, it will not be because the 
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opponents convinced the American people of their moral view166 but because the 
bungling of “conservative” Warren Burger facilitated throwing sand in the gears. 
The subsequent, winding path of the Lockett line depends heavily on the 
individual views of the Justices and the changes in personnel of the Supreme Court.  
This should not be surprising for a doctrine that has no constitutional roots and 
springs from views regarding desirable policy. 
 
VII. A DOG’S BREAKFAST 
 
Ronald Reagan was elected President in 1980.  Justice Stewart retired at the 
end of the October 1980 term, and President Reagan appointed Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor, a state-court judge from Arizona, to succeed him.  She was widely 
expected to be more “conservative” than Justice Stewart, and in some ways she was.  
She authored landmark opinions in criminal law federalism, limiting the second-
guessing of state courts by the federal district and circuit courts.  These included 
major habeas corpus precedents on retroactivity,167 procedural default,168 and the 
statute preventing relitigation in federal court of claims reasonably decided on the 
merits by the state courts.169 
However, Justice O’Connor was an early and enthusiastic proponent of an 
expansive interpretation of Lockett v. Ohio.  She was not an originalist in the mode 
of President Reagan’s later nominees Antonin Scalia and Robert Bork.  She never 
indicated any discomfort with the Lockett rule having been cut out of whole cloth. 
In Justice O’Connor’s first term, the Court took up the case of Eddings v. 
Oklahoma to decide whether it was constitutional to impose the death penalty on a 
16-year-old.170  Instead, the Court decided that the case had to be remanded because, 
even though Oklahoma had an open-ended mitigation statute and the judge did give 
strong weight to Eddings’ youth, he stated he could not consider Eddings’ bad 
childhood and personality disorder, a claim never raised to the state courts.171 
The death penalty litigation in the Supreme Court from McGautha to Lockett 
had been primarily about the constitutionality of state death penalty systems.  In 
Eddings, the Court switched issues to decide a question on the application of the 
Lockett rule in a particular case from a state where the statute on its face 
unquestionably conformed to Lockett.  This was an ominous step toward 
micromanagement, and it would not be the last.  Chief Justice Burger was no doubt 
horrified that the decision he thought would wrap things up with “clear guidance” 
for the State had instead become a license to flyspeck state trial records for 
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compliance with the Court’s fabricated code of sentencing procedure.  He read the 
same record and concluded that the state courts had not refused to consider Eddings’ 
family background and personality disorder but instead had merely assigned them 
little to no weight, a decision well within their authority.172 
By 1987, the Lockett / Eddings rule was so firmly entrenched that in Hitchcock 
v. Dugger, the Supreme Court unanimously overturned a Florida death sentence for 
failure to consider non-statutory mitigating circumstances without even mentioning 
Proffitt.173  The unanimous opinion was written by Justice Scalia, then the junior 
member of the Court, who had come from the D.C. Circuit with no capital case 
experience.  The opinion matter-of-factly overturned the sentence of a man who 
molested his niece and murdered her to keep her quiet due to the trial judge and 
advisory jury’s failure to consider weak mitigating evidence.  Among other things, 
there was testimony that he “had been a fond and affectionate uncle to the children 
of one of his brothers,”174 i.e., the nieces and nephews other than the one he molested 
and murdered.  Justice Scalia would change his tune dramatically as the magnitude 
of the Court’s prior activism and its consequences became clear to him. 
In contrast to Hitchcock and Florida, the decision to apply Lockett to effectively 
revoke the Court’s approval of the Texas system met fierce resistance two years later 
in Penry v. Lynaugh.175  There were multiple issues.  Justice O’Connor was the only 
one in the majority on all of them, and she wrote the opinion of the Court.  Justice 
Scalia wrote the dissent for four Justices on the Lockett v. Jurek issue. 
Penry holds that the Texas system of asking only three specific questions is 
unconstitutional as applied if, under the circumstances of the case, those questions 
do not provide a vehicle for expressing a “reasoned moral response” to the proffered 
mitigating evidence.176  It was obvious at the time of Jurek that the ability to 
shoehorn mitigation into the questions was not unlimited, but the Court upheld the 
statute anyway.  The dissent described at length the clear inconsistency between the 
majority’s holding and Jurek.177  
More important, for present purposes, is the dissent’s final paragraph, echoing 
Justice White’s charge from Lockett that compelling expansive mitigation had 
completely abandoned the anti-arbitrariness basis of Furman.  “The Court has come 
full circle, not only permitting but requiring what Furman once condemned.”178  It 
makes no sense from the standpoint of reducing arbitrariness to say that the state 
must control the jury’s discretion to impose the death penalty but must give free rein 
to decline to impose it.  If some murderers are arbitrarily granted a merciful sentence 
of less than they deserve and others are not, then the ones who are not are arbitrarily 
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sentenced to death.  “The decision whether to impose the death penalty is a unitary 
one; unguided discretion not to impose is unguided discretion to impose as well.”179  
Restricting one side of the coin and not the other only makes sense if the goal is 
simply to minimize the number of death sentences imposed.  Nothing in the 
Constitution authorizes the Supreme Court to override statutes for that purpose. 
The supposed requirements of the Constitution changed between Furman and 
Penry because the focus of concern of a majority of the people charged with 
interpreting the Constitution changed.  It was not because any aspect of the death 
penalty was any more “unusual” in a constitutional sense in 1989 than it was in 1972.  
In 1972, a slim majority was primarily concerned with unequal application.  In 1989, 
a slim majority was primarily concerned with avoiding any person being sentenced 
to death when that was not the “appropriate” sentence,180 even if that meant that 
many who deserved death escaped it arbitrarily and unequal application resulted.  
This change is partly the result of personnel changes on the Court and partly the 
result of Justices changing their minds.  Justice Blackmun joined the majority in 
Penry, though it was contrary to all of his opinions from Furman to Lockett. 
Texas amended its capital sentencing statute to conform to Penry in 1991.181  
That was the end of the Furman hangover.  No state had a statute more restrictive 
on mitigation than the legislature thought desirable because the legislators feared 
that too much discretion on the mitigating side risked having the statute struck down.  
However, the Supreme Court’s decisions on whether the sentencer had been 
provided enough latitude in particular cases remained confused.  
In 1993, the Court decided Graham v. Collins,182 and Justice White wrote the 
opinion for the five-Justice majority consisting of the four Penry dissenters and 
Justice Thomas, who had succeeded Justice Marshall.  Since Penry did not say it 
was overruling Jurek, it could not possibly mean that the defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to an additional instruction beyond the special issues merely 
because he has some mitigating evidence that has implications beyond those 
issues.183  The Court reiterated that view later the same term in Johnson v. Texas,184 
a direct review case where the Court could address the issue without the limitations 
that apply in habeas corpus.  Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the same five-
Justice majority.  In 2007, after further personnel changes and Justice “drift,” 
Graham and Johnson were out, and the expansive Penry view was back in. 
It was almost 30 years after Lockett when the Court decided Abdul-Kabir v. 
Quarterman, and Chief Justice Roberts described the cases as “a dog’s breakfast of 
divided, conflicting, and ever-changing analyses.”185  It was not just commentators 
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who thought so.  The Justices of the Supreme Court itself, “as they shifted from 
being in the majority, plurality, concurrence, or dissent from case to case, repeatedly 
lamenting the failure of their colleagues to follow a consistent path.”186  Because the 
Lockett rule has no foundation in the real Constitution and there is enough 
contradiction in the precedents that support can be found for either side in any case, 
both sides can claim that they are following precedent and the other is violating it, 
and they can both be right and both be wrong. 
 
VIII. THE WAGES OF RESULT-ORIENTATION 
 
The Supreme Court’s inability to agree with itself from one year to the next on 
what the Eighth Amendment requires and what it forbids has had dire consequences.  
In 2000, there was much wailing and gnashing of teeth over a study that found there 
was “serious error” in 68% of capital cases between 1973 and 1995,187 from which 
it was concluded that the process of trying capital cases was “broken” and unreliable.  
However, that study defined “serious error” as any case where the conviction or 
sentence was reversed,188 making no attempt to identify how many cases were 
correctly tried under the law in effect at the time and reversed because the Supreme 
Court changed its mind.  For example, the Hitchcock case discussed earlier,189 went 
to trial when the ink was barely dry on the Proffitt decision upholding Florida’s law.  
The case was tried in accordance with that law and that decision, and the judgment 
was reversed eleven years later based on Lockett’s misrepresentation of Proffitt.  
This counts as “serious error” in the trial court in the Liebman study, but the real 
error was in the Supreme Court.  
My own, more limited study of cases where relief was granted on federal habeas 
corpus found that there were no cases in the sample where the state courts had been 
clearly wrong at the time of their decisions or where the verdict was clearly wrong 
as a matter of basic justice.  The high rates of reversal were due to the Supreme 
Court changing or modifying the rules later or the state and lower federal courts 
disagreeing on application of Supreme Court precedents within the range in which 
reasonable judges can differ.190 
The Lockett rule is not the only one that caused a large number of judgments to 
be reversed because the Supreme Court changed its mind and banned a practice it 
had previously endorsed.  The first two categorical exclusions from the death penalty 
were ones where the constitutionality of the penalty was at least in doubt from the 
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start.  These were rape cases where the victim survives191 and minor accomplices 
without intent to kill caught up in the felony murder rule.192  However, for murderers 
who were 16 or 17 years old at the time of the murder, the Court considered the 
question and expressly held that their youth could be considered as a mitigating 
circumstance and not a categorical exclusion, and then turned around and 
retroactively required exclusion.193  The Court later did the same with mental 
retardation,194 now called “intellectual disability.” 
The Court also contradicted itself on the extent to which jury participation is 
required.  In Proffitt v. Florida, the lead opinion praised Florida’s system of having 
the jury’s verdict be merely advisory as to both the aggravating circumstance making 
the final discretionary decision.195  The Court considered and rejected a Sixth 
Amendment challenge in Spaziano v. Florida196 and again in Walton v. Arizona.197  
Later, the Court overruled Walton in Ring v. Arizona,198 and it overruled Spaziano 
in Hurst v. Florida.199 
Reversals have costs in time, money, justice, and possibly innocent lives.  A 
reversed case goes back to the trial court where there is either a new trial or a bargain 
with a sentence of something less than the defendant would likely get if he went to 
trial.200  A new judgment starts the appeal and habeas corpus process over again, 
with all the delay and expense that entails.  There can also be little doubt that to the 
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extent the death penalty can deter future murders,201 that deterrent effect is 
diminished by the long delays and frequent reversals.202  
Reversals due to changes in the law could be a transient effect that would 
eventually go away if the Supreme Court would stop tinkering, though I would not 
venture to predict that it will.203  But the damage of Lockett is not limited to these 
kinds of reversals.  By opening the penalty phase to everything that can be fit into 
the broad category of “the record and character of the offender,” Lockett has swollen 
both the trial and review process to unnatural proportions. 
In the early cases, the jury already knew most of what it needed to know from 
the guilt phase, before the penalty trial began.  In Gregg v. Georgia, for example, 
neither party introduced any additional evidence in the penalty phase, even though 
the state had a wide-open mitigation statute.  Instead, the penalty phase consisted 
only of lengthy argument.204  Today, the defense demands, in addition to state-paid 
counsel, “mitigation specialists” to investigate the defendant’s entire life and mental 
health evaluations regardless of whether there is any reason to think the defendant 
has a mental illness.205  The claim is made that appeals in capital cases need to take 
longer because of the size of the records,206 but the difference in record length 
between capital and life-without-parole cases consists primarily of mitigation 
evidence that is irrelevant to guilt and often lacks any connection with the crime. 
The permanent cost-and-delay effect of Lockett does not end with trial and 
direct appeal, though.  These effects are manageable.  The fact that Lockett opens up 
essentially unlimited scope in mitigating evidence means that the collateral review 
lawyers have essentially unlimited scope to attack the competence of the trial 
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lawyers.  For example, in Rompilla v. Beard,207 the Supreme Court held that 
committed defense lawyers who worked diligently on the defendant’s behalf208 were 
ineffective for not discovering background information with no demonstrable 
connection to the crime.  They inquired of the people in the best position to know, 
the defendant himself and his family.  Both indicated there was nothing unusual in 
his childhood.209  The lawyers thus had good reason not to expend further resources 
after receiving solid information that this line of inquiry was a dead end and to focus 
their efforts elsewhere.  Even so, they were held ineffective because, if they had 
looked in a file that they should have examined for an entirely different purpose, 
they would have accidentally stumbled upon evidence that contradicted their client’s 
own statements to them.210 
The Rompilla decision is wrong in many ways, as thoroughly explained in the 
dissent, but the entire problem is avoidable.  Lawyers are accused of ineffective 
assistance for their failure to “scour the globe”211 only because the Supreme Court 
has forced the states to allow in mitigation every speck of evidence that globe-
scouring might turn up.  
In evidence law generally, courts have the discretion to exclude evidence on 
the ground that its “probative value is substantially outweighed” by the cost.212  In 
capital sentencing, state legislatures should have the authority to decide what 
categories of mitigating evidence have enough weight to be considered and which 
can be excluded as having too little value to bear their weight.  Evidence with no 
demonstrable connection with the crime would be first on that list.  Indeed, at one 
time the Fifth Circuit adopted a nexus test for evidence with enough weight to be 
considered on a Penry claim, until the Supreme Court declared in Tennard v. Dretke 
that the nexus requirement had no basis in its Lockett / Penry line of cases.213  But 
as the Tennard dissent pointed out, the Lockett / Penry rule “has no basis in the 
Constitution.”214 
The final continuing injury caused by Lockett is the one that Justice White 
denounced on the day of the decision.215  This injury is the most difficult to detect, 
but that does not mean that does not matter.  The Lockett rule weakens the reforms 
enacted after Furman to make capital sentencing more structured and more 
evenhanded.  A guided discretion system would be more likely to produce even-
handed results if the designation of mitigating factors were made on a uniform, 
                                                                                                                                                                           
207 Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005). 
208 Id. at 396, 398–99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
209 Id. at 381; id. at 398–99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
210 Id. at 383–84; id. at 405 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
211 Id. at 383.  The majority denied it was authorizing an attack on that basis, but it was. 
212 See FED. R. EVID. 403. 
213 Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284 (2004). 
214 See id. at 293 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
215 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 623 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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statewide basis, rather than letting each juror decide that question individually.216  In 
an “anything goes” system, the skills of the lawyers presenting and opposing the 
case in mitigation and the idiosyncrasies and gullibility of the jurors chosen for a 
particular case can have significant impact on a process that is supposed to be about 
the culpability of the defendant.  Perfect evenhandedness is not achievable, of 
course, and cannot be constitutionally required.  But reducing it is a worthy goal, 
and the Lockett rule interferes with achieving it. 
The Lockett rule served a useful function in purging our statutes of the Furman 
hangover.  That is, legislatures had enacted statutes that were more restrictive on 
mitigation than they would have chosen under their own judgment on good policy 
because they quite reasonably believed that Furman would not allow broad 
mitigation.  Since Lockett, death penalty statutes have been enacted or amended 
under the opposite mandate with opposite results.  Legislatures provide for unlimited 
mitigation even when they would prefer to restrict it.  No doubt many would like to 
restrict mitigation with no connection to the crime, as the Fifth Circuit did before 
being reversed217 and as the Arizona Supreme Court did at one time.218  Such 
policymaking is within the legislative power, and nothing in the Constitution 
removes it from the legislature. 
 
IX. THE FAULT, DEAR SCOTUS . . .219 
 
In 1994, Justice Blackmun penned his well-known dissent from the denial of 
certiorari in the capital case of Callins v. Collins,220 containing the famous or 
notorious (depending on one’s viewpoint) statement at the beginning of this article.  
The central thesis of the dissent was that the principle and purpose of Furman v. 
Georgia could not be reconciled with the subsequent decisions in Woodson, Lockett, 
and Eddings,221 all of which were incorrectly decided according to Justice Blackmun 
at the time.222 The solution to that dilemma is obvious.  If one line of cases that was 
wrongly decided in the first place conflicts with another line, just overrule it.  Justice 
Scalia forcefully pointed that out.223 
                                                                                                                                                                           
216 See McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 442–43 (1990). 
217 See supra text accompanying notes 213–214. 
218 See State v. Ross, 886 P.2d 1354, 1364 (Ariz. 1994). 
219 “Men at some time are masters of their fates / The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, / But 
in ourselves.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, JULIUS CAESAR act 1, sc. 2. 
220 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994). 
221 Id. at 1144, 1147–48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
222 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 307–08 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); 
see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 120 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (joined by Justice 
Blackmun et al.); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 613 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) 
(“a reason more limited”). 
223 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1142 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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To that argument, Justice Blackmun could only respond with generalities.  It is 
one thing to say that individualized sentencing is required in order to be fair;224 it is 
another to say that it is constitutionally required.225  But even assuming that 
Woodson was correct in requiring individualized sentencing, it is a giant leap farther 
to say that consideration of absolutely everything in the defendant’s background is 
constitutionally required.  Justice Blackmun said that limiting the sentencer to a 
specific list of circumstances “is offensive to our sense of fundamental fairness and 
respect for the uniqueness of the individual.”226  Whose sense is “our sense”?  Not 
the American people’s.  The legislative response to Furman demonstrated 
conclusively that if the people had to choose between limiting discretion or 
abolishing the death penalty, they would choose limiting discretion.  If “our sense” 
refers to the sense of people who happen to be sitting on the Supreme Court at any 
particular point in history, declaring that they can override the will of the people 
based on nothing more, Justice Blackman’s thesis is contrary to the far more 
important value of democratic self-government. 
Going beyond arbitrariness in general to the specific problem of racial bias, 
Justice Blackmun relied solely on the Baldus study.227  After describing Baldus’s 
findings and discussing the McCleskey opinion, Justice Blackmun made the jaw-
dropping statement that “as far as I know, there has been no serious effort to impeach 
the Baldus study.”228  Incredibly, a Justice of the United States Supreme Court who 
participated in a landmark case did not read the district court opinion in the case.  
There is no other explanation for Justice Blackmun’s ignorance on this point.  Not 
only did the State of Georgia make a “serious effort to impeach the Baldus study,” 
the State prevailed at trial with a court finding that the study does not show what it 
purports to show.  “The best models which Baldus was able to devise which account 
to any significant degree for the major non-racial variables, including strength of the 
evidence, produce no statistically significant evidence that race plays a part in either 
[the prosecutor’s or the jury’s] decisions in the State of Georgia.”229  The entire point 
was built on a foundation of sand.230  No other Justice joined Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent.231 
The next broad-based, single-justice attack on the death penalty was based on 
the length of time it takes from judgment to execution.  Prosecutors and advocates 
for victims of crime have long decried the excessive time it takes to adjudicate 
                                                                                                                                                                           
224 See id. at 1144 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)). 
225 Cf. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 226 (1971) (Black, J., concurring) (no deprivation 
of rights “explicitly or impliedly guaranteed by the . . . provisions of the Bill of Rights”). 
226 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1150 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
227 Id. at 1153–54. 
228 Id. at 1154. 
229 McCleskey v. Zant, 580 F. Supp. 338, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (emphasis omitted). 
230 Later studies are discussed in my previous article, Kent Scheidegger, Rebutting the Myths 
About Race and the Death Penalty, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 147 (2012). 
231 See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1143. 
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capital cases through the multiple layers of review.232  In Lackey v. Texas,233 Justice 
Stevens took the surprising position that a capital judgment might be subject to 
reversal simply because of the length of time it took to review.  Four years later, 
Justice Breyer took up what is now known as “the Lackey claim” in Knight v. 
Florida.234  In lamenting the length of time the cases had taken, Justice Breyer 
completely failed to account for the Supreme Court’s own culpability in causing the 
delay. 
The obvious answer to a Lackey claim, Justice Thomas noted, is that the 
defendant cannot “avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral procedures 
and then complain when his execution is delayed.”235  Justice Breyer’s response that 
is the State, not the defendant, is responsible for the portion of the delay “which 
resulted in large part from the States’ failure to apply constitutionally sufficient 
procedures at the time of initial sentencing.”236  However, the procedures used at 
Knight’s initial sentence were “constitutionally sufficient” at the time.  Knight was 
tried in 1975 in accordance with the statute and procedures that the Supreme Court 
upheld as constitutional the next year in Proffitt.  Only after the Supreme Court 
amended the Constitution in Lockett and then made clear in Hitchcock v. Dugger 
that this did indeed override what they said in Proffitt237 was Knight’s initial 
sentence overturned.238  
The delay that Justice Breyer would blame on the State is actually the fault of 
the Supreme Court itself.  Justice Thomas noted, correctly, “in most cases raising 
this novel claim, the delay in carrying out the prisoner’s execution stems from this 
Court’s Byzantine death penalty jurisprudence.”239  First on the list of Justice 
Thomas’s examples of Byzantine jurisprudence is the Lockett / Penry mess, as 
masterfully dissected in his 1993 concurrence in Graham v. Collins.240 
At the time of Knight, Congress had already acted to reduce delay with the 
landmark Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.241  If properly 
implemented, this act would have drastically reduced litigation time in the federal 
                                                                                                                                                                           
232 See KENT S. SCHEIDEGGER, CRIMINAL JUSTICE LEGAL FOUND., OVERDUE PROCESS: A STUDY 
OF FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS IN CAPITAL CASES AND A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM 1–2 (1995), 
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234 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
235 Id. at 990 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
236 Id. at 998. 
237 See supra text accompanying notes 173–174. 
238 See Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 708 (11th Cir. 1988); Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 
393, 395 (1987).  The district court had denied habeas corpus relief before the Supreme Court decided 
Hitchcock.  See id. 
239 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 991 (1999) (citations omitted). 
240 Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478–500 (1993) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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courts on habeas corpus.  Rather than relitigating de novo questions of law and mixed 
questions of law and fact already fully decided by the state courts, federal courts 
cannot grant relief if the state court decision is neither “contrary to” nor an 
“unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court.”242  Faithfully applied, this would make most federal habeas corpus 
cases quick, as determining that a prior court’s decision is reasonable is far simpler 
than relitigating the case, and genuinely unreasonable decisions are rare.  Most 
issues should be decided at the threshold from an examination of the state court 
record and decision.  That is not how it is applied, however.  A large part of the 
problem is “massive resistance” on the part of the lower federal courts who don’t 
want to give up their power.243  Another large part of the problem, though, is the 
amorphous nature of ineffective assistance of counsel claims in the penalty phase 
when combined with the Lockett rule. 
The bottom line is that much, and perhaps most, of what is genuinely wrong 
with the death penalty in America today is the fault of the federal courts and 
particularly the Supreme Court.  The final question is what can and should the 
Supreme Court do about it. 
 
X. A MODEST PROPOSAL. 
 
Not every precedent that was wrongly decided should be overruled.  Chief 
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion244 declining to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 
though there is little doubt that he believed the case to have been wrongly decided 
as an initial matter.245  Among the considerations in deciding to overrule a precedent 
are whether it has become unworkable, “the antiquity of the precedent, the reliance 
interests at stake, and of course whether the decision was well reasoned.”246  A final 
factor is whether Congress can change the rule, making the Court more reluctant to 
overrule statutory interpretation precedents.247 
The Lockett rule seems simple enough on its face, and it is readily applied at 
trial.  The trial judge need only allow the defense to introduce anything and 
everything that can be fitted into the spacious categories of the defendant’s character 
and record and then instruct the jury to consider it all but make their own judgment 
as to how much, if any, weight to give it.  The unworkability of the rule comes at 
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the review stage, where the amorphous nature of the Lockett rule creates unlimited 
scope to attack trial counsel’s performance.  The infinite supply of hindsight 
critiques makes it easier to overturn well-deserved death sentences for those who are 
of a mind to overturn them.248  Where the judgment is upheld, large amounts of 
money and time are spent litigating evidence of dubious probative value. 
The reliance interest is zero.  It is highly unlikely that anyone decides to commit 
murder in reliance on the Lockett rule saving his neck, and if he did such reliance is 
not one society should recognize or accommodate. 
At 40, the Lockett rule is old but not antique.249  As to strength of reasoning, 
few Supreme Court precedents have weaker reasoning. 
I propose that Lockett be replaced by a more workable rule.  Allowing the jury 
to consider all the facts of crime is manageable.  The evidence is before them anyway 
from the guilt phase of the trial, and they would likely consider it whether instructed 
to or not.  For evidence unconnected to the crime, the Florida statute in Proffitt, 
copied from the Model Penal Code, listed only two: lack of a significant criminal 
record and youth.250  Both of these are objective and easily determined. 
For everything else, restore to the people the ability to decide through the 
democratic process which mitigating circumstances have enough probative value to 
be worth the burden of litigating them and then litigating whether defense counsel 
presented them well enough.  The real Constitution does not transfer this decision 
from the people to the judiciary, and it is high time to give back to the people the 
authority that is rightfully theirs. 
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